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INTRODUCTION

This Article highlights noteworthy developments in Illinois administrative law by examining some of the major decisions handed
down by Illinois courts during the Survey period. This Article also
reviews legislative enactments of the Illinois General Assembly
*
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passed during the Survey period that affect administrative law.
The case law and legislation discussed clarify the role of the administrative agency and influence review of agency action.
II.

CASE LAW

A. Agency Action
A survey of administrative law properly begins with the agency
and its administrative functions. Each agency's functions are defined in an enabling act. A legislative body delegates some of its
power to the agency in the enabling act and sets the parameters of
agency authority to make rules and adjudicate controversies.
1. Municipalities as Agencies
Municipalities sometimes act as administrative entities and
sometimes as home rule units, empowered by the state constitution
to exercise broader legislative authority. The distinction between
home rule and administrative action is important because a home
rule unit's legislative action is accorded greater deference by the
courts, whereas administrative action is subject to a stricter standard of review.
The Illinois Supreme Court examined the distinction between
home rule legislative and administrative action in LandmarksPreservation Council v. Chicago.1 The plaintiffs in Landmarks challenged the Chicago City Council's ordinance rescinding the
landmark status of the McCarthy Building. 2 The plaintiffs maintained that the City Council violated the Chicago Landmarks Ordinance by failing to hold a hearing prior to taking this action.
1. 125 Ill. 2d 164, 531 N.E.2d 9 (1988); see also infra Troy and Fehringer, State and
Local Government, 21 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 601 (1990).
2. 125 Ill. 2d at 167, 531 N.E.2d at 10. The McCarthy Building had been previously
declared a landmark by the City Council at a time when it was considered a "cornerstone" of a plan to rejuvenate Chicago's North Loop. Id. at 170-71, 531 N.E.2d at 11.
Later, it became doubtful that the McCarthy Building could be integrated into the redevelopment. Id. at 171, 531 N.E.2d at 11. After reviewing recommendations by various
city commissions, the City Council rescinded the landmark status. Id. at 172, 531
N.E.2d at 12.
3. Id. at 169-70, 531 N.E.2d at 11 (citing CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 2176 (1989)). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated a provision of the Chicago
Municipal Code, which provides in part: "Any designation of an area, district, place,
building, structure, work of art, or other similar object as a 'Chicago landmark' shall only
be amended or rescinded in the same manner and procedure as the original designation
was made." CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 21-76 (1989). The original landmark
designation of the McCarthy Building was made after potentially interested parties were
given notice of a public hearing on the matter. Landmarks, 125 Ill. 2d at 170, 531
N.E.2d at 11. The record contained no evidence that a public hearing was held before the
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The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action, and the plaintiffs appealed directly to the supreme
court.4

The supreme court rejected the defendant's contention that the
City Council was performing a reviewable administrative function
when it rescinded the landmark designation.' The court did recognize that in some circumstances a municipality may be required
to perform an administrative function. 6 Municipalities more commonly performed administrative functions prior to becoming home
rule units in 1970. 7 Since 1970, however, municipalities have
broader authority that allows them to perform legislative
functions.
The court determined that the City Council enacted the ordinance rescinding the landmark status pursuant to its legislative authority and that it was not performing an administrative function
pursuant to a delegation of authority from the General Assembly. 9
Keeping in mind that judicial authority to review legislative action
is quite limited, the court reiterated the well-established rule that
legislative action is reviewable only when it allegedly violates a
constitutional provision or a state or federal statute. 10 Because the
rescission, although the defendants maintained that such a hearing was conducted. Id. at
172, 531 N.E.2d at 12.
4. Id. at 168, 531 N.E.2d at 10. Direct appeal was proper pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 302(b), which provides for direct appeal of cases when the public interest requires
expeditious determination. See ILL. S. CT. R. 302(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para.
302(b) (1987).
5. Landmarks, 125 Ill. 2d at 180, 531 N.E.2d at 16.
6. Id. For example, certain municipalities are required by statute to establish a zoning board of appeals, an administrative body. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para.
11-13-3 (1987)).
7. Id. at 180-81, 531 N.E.2d at 16. Before the Illinois Constitution of 1970 granted
home rule authority, municipalities were required to look to the General Assembly to
grant them limited authority to enact zoning laws. Id. On that basis, the court distinguished Treadway v. City of Rockford, 24 Ill. 2d 488, 182 N.E.2d 219 (1962), a pre-1970
Constitution case relied on by the plaintiff. Landmarks, 125 Ill. 2d at 181, 531 N.E.2d at
16. In Treadway, a municipality was properly subject to administrative review because
plaintiff alleged that the city council violated the then-existing zoning enabling act. Id.
(citing Treadway, 24 Ill. 2d 488, 182 N.E.2d 219 (1962)).
8. Id. at 178, 531 N.E.2d at 15. Article VII of the 1970 Illinois Constitution sets the
parameters of home rule authority by providing:
Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and
perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not
limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety,
morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.
ILL. CONST. OF 1970 art. VII, § 6(a).
9. Landmarks, 125 Ill. 2d at 180, 531 N.E.2d at 16.
10. Id. at 179, 531 N.E.2d at 15 (citing Illinois Gasoline Dealers Ass'n v. Chicago,
119 Ill. 2d 391, 404, 519 N.E.2d 447, 452 (1988) ("[aln act cannot be declared invalid for
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plaintiffs did not point to any statutory infringement or constitutional infirmity, the court upheld the ordinance."
2.

Scope of Agency Jurisdiction

Occasionally, more than one agency claims it is authorized to
resolve a given dispute. Because plaintiffs sometimes may elect between administrative remedies, determining the scope of each
agency's relevant jurisdiction is important.
One administrative entity challenged another's jurisdiction in
Village of Bellwood Board of Fire and Police Commissioners v.
Human Rights Commission.1 2 The plaintiff ("Bellwood") maintained that the defendant ("Commission") lacked authority to review Bellwood's decision to terminate a probationary police
officer. 13 The police officer filed a charge with the Commission
against Bellwood, alleging that his discharge was motivated by racial animus. 4 A Commission hearing officer found in his favor
and ordered Bellwood to pay back pay, damages, attorney fees and
costs.' 5 Bellwood filed for administrative review and requested an
oral argument before the Commission.16 The Commission adopted
the order of the hearing officer with minor alterations.' 7 Bellwood
appealed, arguing that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over the
dispute. I"
Bellwood claimed that the police officer's proper recourse was
review of Bellwood's action under the Administrative Review
Law.' 9 The Municipal Code vests authority in Bellwood to establish a Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, 20 and it grants the
a failure of a house to observe its own rules. Courts will not inquire whether such rules
have been observed in the passage of the act.")).
11. Id.
12. 184 111. App. 3d 339, 541 N.E.2d 1248 (1st Dist.), appealdenied, 545 N.E.2d 133
(1989).
13. Id. at 342, 541 N.E.2d at 1250.
14. Id. at 342, 541 N.E.2d at 1250-51.
15. Id. at 342, 541 N.E.2d at 1250.
16. Id. at 345, 541 N.E.2d at 1252.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 342, 541 N.E.2d at 1250. In response, the police officer argued that Bellwood waived its right to raise the issue of agency jurisdiction by failing to file a motion to
dismiss his complaint and by failing to raise the issue in its statement of exceptions. Id. at
345-46, 541 N.E.2d at 1252. The court ruled that Bellwood had addressed the jurisdictional issue in its various pleadings and motions before the Commission. Id. at 346, 541
N.E.2d at 1253.
19. Id. at 345, 541 N.E. 2d at 1252. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 3-101 to
-112 (1987).
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, para. 10-2.1-1 (1987).
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Board nearly exclusive authority to appoint all members of the police department and to make all rules for appointments and removal. 2' Further, the Municipal Code provides for specific
procedures to be followed in the event that removal or discharge of
an officer is sought. 22 Judicial review of final administrative decisions of the Bellwood Board is governed by the Administrative Review Law.23
Bellwood argued that the Commission lacked jurisdiction based
on the court's earlier decision in Board of Trustees Police Pension v.
Human Rights Commission.24 In Board of Trustees, the court had
carved out a narrow exception to the Commission's authority to
decide civil rights cases.2 ' The complainant, an insulin dependent
diabetic, filed a charge of handicap discrimination with the Commission after he was denied the opportunity to participate in the
Police Pension Fund.26 The Board of Trustees court noted that the
Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought pursuant to the Illinois Human Rights Act. 27 The Pension Board created under the Illinois Pension Code, however, has the exclusive
power and duty to manage the pension fund. 8 Consequently, the
Pension Board had jurisdiction over the claim, even though it involved a civil rights violation. 29 The Board of Trustees court thus
found that the Pension Board's exclusive power and duty created
an exception to the exclusivity provisions of the Human Rights
Act.30
Nevertheless, the Bellwood court reasoned that unlike the Pension Board in Board of Trustees, the Bellwood Board had no exclusive authority to manage the police department.3" The court found
no provision in the Municipal Code that conflicted with the exclu21. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, paras. 10-2.1-4, 10-2.1-5 (1987). The Board's authority is
exclusive unless the city council or board of trustees provides for different appointment
and removal procedures by ordinance. Id. para. 10-2.1-4.
22. Id. para. 10-2.1-17.
23. Bellwood, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 346, 541 N.E.2d at 1253 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, paras. 3-101 to 3-112 (1987)).
24. Id. (citing Board of Trustees v. Human Rights Comm'n, 141 Ill. App. 3d 447, 490
N.E.2d 232 (4th Dist. 1986)).
25. Board of Trustees, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 454, 490 N.E.2d at 235-36.
26. Id. at 450, 490 N.E.2d at 233.
27. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 8-102 (1987).
28. Board of Trustees, 141 111. App. 3d at 452-53, 490 N.E.2d at 234-35 (citing ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 108 1/2, paras. 3-101, 3-132 (1987)).
29. Id. at 453, 490 N.E.2d at 235.
30. Id. at 454, 490 N.E.2d at 235-36.
31. Bellwood, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 347, 541 N.E.2d at 1254.
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sive jurisdiction of the Commission over civil rights violations. a2
The Bellwood court concluded that, although the Administrative
Review Law provides for judicial review, the Human Rights Act
provides a separate recourse. 3 Bellwood thus presents a situation
in which a petitioner can elect between two agencies that have concurrent jurisdiction.
3. Agency Rulemaking Authority
Kaufman Grain Company v. Director Department of Agriculture 34 reaffirms the principle that courts may decide whether agencies have promulgated their rules improperly. It further reasserts
that improper rules may not be invoked by an agency for any purpose. The litigation in Kaufman Grain arose out of a dispute between Kaufman and its landlord over Kaufman's assessed damage
discount. 3a The landlord wrote to the Illinois Department of Agriculture ("Department") complaining about the assessment, and
the Department held a hearing on the matter. 36 Relying on a policy that allowed it to adjudicate disputes between grain dealers and
warehouses concerning the quality of grain, the Department reduced the damage discount.3 7 Upon judicial review, the circuit
court affirmed the Department's ruling. 8 Before the appellate
court, Kaufman Grain argued that the Department had relied on
purported rules that were not properly promulgated and that were
therefore void. 9
Initially, the court had little difficulty holding that the Department's policy was a "rule" within the meaning of section 3.09 of
the Administrative Procedure Act ("Act").' Section 5.01 of the
32. Id.
33. Id. at 348, 541 N.E.2d at 1254. The interpretation Bellwood advocated would
preclude certain government employees from seeking redress under the provisions of the
Human Rights Act. Id. As a matter of public policy, the Bellwood court found that
interpretation unacceptable. Id.
34. 179 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 534 N.E.2d 1259 (4th Dist. 1988).
35. Id. at 1042, 534 N.E.2d at 1261.
36. Id.
37. Id at 1044, 534 N.E.2d at 1262.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1046, 534 N.E.2d 1264. Section 3.09 defines an agency "rule" as an:
agency statement of general applicability that implements, applies, interprets, or
prescribes law or policy, but does not include (a) statements concerning only
the internal management of an agency and not affecting private rights or procedures available to persons or entities outside the agency, (b) informal advisory
rulings issued pursuant to Section 9, (c) intra-agency memoranda or (d) the
prescription of standardized forms.
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Act, however, mandates that the agency conduct a public notice
and comment proceeding prior to enacting a rule. 4' The Department admitted that it did not comply with any of the mandated
procedures for adopting rules.42 The court concluded that the Department lacked authority to rule on the disagreement if it did not
give the public proper notice of its jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes of this type.43 Thus, the court's decision in Kaufman Grain
invalidated the Department's de facto rule for settling disputes between grain producers and dealers.
4.

Agency Investigative Procedures

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, People v.
Krull4 came before the Illinois Supreme Court for a ruling regarding the scope of a statute authorizing warrantless administrative
searches. The search at issue took place in 1981 when a police
officer searched a metal company pursuant to a provision of the
Illinois Vehicle Code that authorized warrantless administrative
searches of automobile wrecking yards.4" The circuit court held
the statutory provision unconstitutional, and it suppressed evidence obtained during the search.46 The Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed.47 On a grant of certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court held that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule4" does not
apply to evidence seized by a police officer who, in objective good
faith, reasonably relied on a statute that authorized a warrantless
administrative search even if the statute is later declared unconstitutional.49 On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the
officer in question did not exceed the scope of the statute that was
ch. 127, para. 1003.09 (1987).
41. Id. para. 1005.01.
42. Kaufman Grain, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 1047, 534 N.E.2d at 1264.
43. Id. The court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for an
order awarding Kaufman Grain attorney fees reasonably incurred in the litigation. Id. at
1048, 534 N.E.2d at 1265. The court also ordered the landlord to return the warehouse
receipt or its value to Kaufman Grain. Id. at 1049, 534 N.E.2d at 1265-66.
44. 126 Ill. 2d 235, 534 N.E.2d 125 (1989).
45. Id. at 237, 126 Ill. 2d at 125. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 5-401(e)
(1987).
46. Krull, 126 I11. 2d at 237, 534 N.E.2d at 125.
47. Id. at 238, 534 N.E.2d at 126. See People v. Krull, 107 Ill. 2d 107, 481 N.E.2d
703 (1985).
48. The exclusionary rule is a remedial measure which excludes evidence at trial that
has been obtained in violation of the privileges guaranteed by the Constitution. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987).
49. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349-50.
ILL. REV. STAT.
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then in effect. 50
It is important to note that the 1989 Illinois Supreme Court decision in Krull has limited application. In interpreting a statute
that is no longer in effect, the court in Krull stressed the limited
5
nature of its holding. 1
The court considered agency subpoena power in Naguit v.
Selcke.52 After reviewing prescription records compiled by the Illinois Department of Alcohol and Substance Abuse, the Department
of Professional Regulation ("Department")5 3 initiated an investigation into whether a Dr. Naguit was improperly prescribing controlled substances to his patients. 54 The Department issued a
subpoena directing the doctor to produce patient records, test results and medication records for fifteen named patients. 55 The doctor complied, but afterwards, he complained that the subpoena's
issuance was improper.56
After passage of the Medical Practice Act of 198717 changed the
law governing licensing and regulation of physicians, the Department issued a second subpoena that complied with the requirements of the new law.5 There was no dispute that under the new
law, the Department was entitled to the materials sought under the
original subpoena. 9 This time, the doctor refused to comply and
challenged the legality of the Department's actions.'
The doctor argued that the improperly issued first subpoena
"tainted" the second, rendering it improper as well. 6 ' The doctor
maintained that the second subpoena was tainted because the finding of probable cause upon which it was based depended on the
contents of the records secured by the original subpoena. 62 The
50. Krull, 126 Il. 2d at 245, 534 N.E.2d at 129.
51. Id. at 248, 534 N.E.2d at 130.
52. 184 Ill. App. 3d 80, 539 N.E.2d 1353 (5th Dist. 1989).
53. The Department of Professional Regulation is now called the Department of Registration and Education. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4400-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1989). See also infra note 248 and accompanying text (additional discussion of this
change).
54. Naguit, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 81, 539 N.E.2d at 1354.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 4400-1 to 4478-1 (1987). See infra notes 24751 and accompanying text (discussion of the most recent changes to the Medical Practice
Act).
58. Naguit, 184 I1. App. 3d at 82, 539 N.E.2d at 1355.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 83, 539 N.E.2d at 1355.
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circuit court agreed and issued an order enjoining the Department
from using the records in bringing disciplinary action against the
doctor.63
On appeal, the appellate court reversed, concluding that the doctor failed to plead and prove a clear and ascertainable right in need
of protection, a prerequisite to obtaining a preliminary injunction. 64 The court determined that the doctor's argument was a variation of the exclusionary rule65 which does not apply in
administrative proceedings.6 6 The court further reasoned that even
if the rule applied, it would not aid the doctor because the evidence
indicated that the records obtained pursuant to the first subpoena
played no part in the second subpoena's procurement.6 7 Therefore,
the court held that the doctor had failed to make the requisite
showing of a likelihood of success on the merits. 6
B.

Agency Hearings

The plaintiff in an administrative proceeding has a right to present his or her case to an impartial hearing officer. Two cases decided during the Survey period clarify the hearing officer's role.
1.

Role of the Hearing Officer

In DeBarnardv. State Board of Education,69 DeBarnard received
a hearing after she was terminated from her position as a tenured
high school teacher pursuant to the School Code.7 ° She appealed
the hearing officer's decision in part on the ground that she had
been denied a fair hearing due to a pre-hearing, ex parte communication between the Board and the hearing officer.7 '
DeBarnard learned that the School Board had sent a book of
63. Id. at 82, 539 N.E.2d at 1355.
64. Id. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must "plead and prove the
following: (1) a clear and ascertainable right in need of protection; (2) an irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) an inadequate remedy at law; and (4) a likelihood of success on the merits." Id. (citing Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 169 Ill.
App. 3d 1014, 1016, 524 N.E.2d 228, 229 (1st Dist. 1988)).
65. See supra note 48 for an explanation of the exclusionary rule.
66. Naguit, 184 Ill. App. 3d 83, 539 N.E.2d at 1355 (citing Distaola v. Department of
Regis. & Educ., 72 Ill. App. 3d 977, 982, 391 N.E.2d 489, 492 (1st Dist. 1979)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 83, 539 N.E.2d at 1356. See supra note 64 for a list of the elements necessary for a preliminary injunction.
69. 172 Ill. App. 3d 938, 527 N.E.2d 616 (2d Dist. 1988).
70. Id. at 939-40, 527 N.E.2d at 616 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 24-12
(1987)).
71. Id. at 940, 527 N.E.2d at 616.
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evidentiary materials to the hearing officer three days before the
hearing began. 2 She then moved for a mistrial, arguing that it was
improper for the School Board to communicate with the hearing
officer ex parte. 73 Her motion was denied. 74 The hearing officer's
opinion stated that DeBarnard could resign within thirty days or
consider herself fired. 75 Rather than resign, she filed for administrative review. The circuit court held that the hearing officer's decision was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.76
On appeal, DeBarnard argued that the hearing officer's consideration of the evidence, prior to the hearing, biased him against her in
77
violation of her due process right to a fair and impartial hearing.
The appellate court took note of several cases cited by the
School Board which held that an adjudicator's familiarity with the
subject matter of a hearing alone does not deprive a party of the
right to a fair hearing.7 s These cases were decided in the context of
school board dismissals in which the adjudicator obtained information by virtue of its other role as investigator.79
The court concluded that there was even less chance of bias
against DeBarnard than in the cases relied on by the School Board
because a hearing officer performs a single, adjudicative function. 0
Furthermore, DeBarnard could not show that the hearing officer's
pre-hearing consideration of the book resulted in any actual prejudice to her."' Therefore, the court affirmed the circuit court's
decision. 2
In Moon Lake Convalescent Center v. Margolis,3 the court had
to determine whether the Director of the Department of Public
Health ("Department") properly delegated adjudicatory authority
to an independent contractor. After a hearing on the nursing
home's violations of minimum care standards, the hearing officer
72. Id. at 945, 527 N.E.2d at 620.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 942, 527 N.E.2d at 618.
76. Id. at 943, 527 N.E.2d at 619.
77. Id. at 945, 527 N.E.2d at 620.
78. Id. at 945-46, 527 N.E.2d at 620-21 (citing Fender v. School Dist. No. 25, 37 Ill.
App. 3d 736, 744, 347 N.E.2d 270, 277 (1st Dist. 1976) ("Absent facts demonstrating
that a board's prehearing involvement foreclosed fair consideration of evidence presented
at the hearing, a due process violation is not shown.")).
79. Id. at 946, 527 N.E.2d at 621.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 180 Ill. App. 3d 245, 535 N.E.2d 956 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 114
(1989).
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decided to impose penalties and to revoke Moon Lake's license. 84
Moon Lake argued that the hearing officer's acts were void because
he was not an employee of the Department.85
Moon Lake maintained that because the hearing officer's status
was that of independent contractor, he did not satisfy the statutory
requirements for a hearing officer set forth in section 3-704 of the
Nursing Home Care Reform Act of 1979.86 That section requires
the hearing officer to be "the Director or a duly qualified employee
of the Department designated in writing by the Director . . 87
Section 1-110, a general definitional provision, defines "Director"
as the "Director of Public Health or his designee."8 8 Moon Lake
maintained that if anyone can be a "designee," the phrase "duly
qualified employee" becomes meaningless.89 The circuit court
agreed and reversed the hearing officer's decision. 9°
The appellate court rejected Moon Lake's statutory construction
argument, citing precedent and legislative intent. 9 Similarly, in a
case involving interpretation of the Illinois Banking Act, Heritage
Bank & Trust Co. v. Harris,92 the plaintiff argued that the words
"another bank" should be read "another state bank" or the word
"another" became superfluous. 93 The Heritage Bank court ruled
that legislative intent must be discerned from the statute's clear
language, and the Moon Lake court agreed.94 Accordingly, the
Moon Lake court held that the legislature did not intend to place
eligibility requirements on hearing officers; inclusion of "or his designee" merely demonstrates an awareness that the Director cannot
perform every agency function. 95 Finally, the court noted that after the circuit court's decision in Moon Lake, the legislature
amended the Act so that any "person" designated by the Director
84. Id. at 248, 535 N.E.2d at 958.
85. Id. at 251, 535 N.E.2d at 960.
86. Id. at 252-53, 535 N.E.2d at 961 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 4153704 (1987)).
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, para. 4153-704 (1987).
88. Id. para. 4151-110. See infra note 96 (indicating that this definition was later
amended).
89. Moon Lake, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 253, 535 N.E.2d at 962.
90. Id. at 248, 535 N.E.2d at 958.
91. Id. at 253-254, 535 N.E.2d at 960-62.
92. 132 Ill. App. 3d 969, 478 N.E.2d 526 (1st Dist. 1985).
93. Id. at 976-77, 478 N.E.2d at 532 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 68(4)(h)
(1987)).
94. Id. at 977, 478 N.E.2d at 532.
95. Moon Lake, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 254, 535 N.E.2d at 962.
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can now be a hearing officer. 96 This amendment, the court reasoned, reflected the legislature's initial intent. 97
2. Hearsay Evidence and Agency Proceedings
Although some evidentiary requirements may be relaxed in an
administrative proceeding, .the fundamental rules of evidence, including the hearsay rule and its exceptions, still apply. 98 In Eastman v. Departmentof PublicAid, 99 Eastman, a public aid recipient,
contended that an adverse ruling was based on improperly admitted hearsay evidence. ' I Evidence against Eastman included computer printouts prepared by the Department of Public Aid
("Department") that showed that, due to a computer error, a
double allotment of food stamps was sent to Eastman.'0 1 There
was no significant evidence against Eastman other than the
printouts. 10 2 Eastman objected to admission of the printouts as
hearsay and as lacking foundation. 103 The circuit court affirmed
the decision against Eastman, holding that the printouts were public records admissible under the public records exception to the
hearsay rule. 10
The appellate court reversed and, as a threshold matter, it noted
that the hearsay rule applies in an administrative proceeding because it "is a fundamental and not a technical rule."' 1 5 Under a
well-established exception to the hearsay rule, however, public
records are admissible if there is foundation to indicate their trustworthiness.' ° 6 Although these computer printouts constituted
public records, the Department failed to offer any foundation testi96. Id. See 1988 Ill. Laws, P.A. 85-1183, amending ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111 1/2,
para. 4153-704(a) (1987).
97. Moon Lake, 180 Ill. App. 3d at 254, 535 N.E.2d at 962. After determining that
the hearing officer was duly authorized, the court found substantial evidence to support
his ruling that the nursing home had committed acts of negligence warranting revocation
of the home's license. Id. at 262, 535 N.E.2d at 967.
98. See Jamison v. Weaver, 30 Il.App. 3d 389, 396, 332 N.E.2d 563, 568 (1st Dist.
1975).
99. 178 Ill. App. 3d 993, 534 N.E.2d 458 (2d Dist. 1989).
100. Id. at 994, 534 N.E.2d at 459.
101. Id. at 995, 534 N.E.2d at 460.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 995-96, 534 N.E.2d at 460. See FED. R. EvID. 803(8).
105. 178 Ill. App. 3d at 996, 534 N.E.2d at 460-62 (citing Jamison, 30 Ill.
App. 3d at
396, 332 N.E.2d at 568).
106. Id. at 998, 534 N.E.2d at 461. Foundation evidence would include testimony
that "the electronic computing technology is recognized as standard, [and that] the entries are made in the regular course of business reasonably near the time of the happening
of the event recorded .... Id.
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mony to justify their admission. 10 7 In fact, the evidence showed
that one of the printouts contained clearly erroneous information. 1 O8 Therefore, the court held that the foundation requirement
was not met
and ruled that it was substantial error to admit the
printouts. 109
3.

Consolidation of Agency Proceedings

Sapstein Brothers Pharmacy, Inc. v. Department of Registration
and Education 110 reaffirms an agency's right to consolidate actions
when there are common issues of law or fact. In Sapstein, the Illinois Department of Registration and Education 1 I ("Department")
filed a complaint against two registered pharmacists, charging
them with violations in connection with controlled substances
shortages and overages. 112 At the hearing, the pharmacists moved
for severance. 11 3 The hearing officer denied the motion, finding
that the cases involved the same issues, a common core of facts,
and that the pharmacists did not show that they would be
prejudiced by consolidation." 4
After the hearing officer denied the severance motion, the Department called four witnesses and the pharmacists' attorneys
cross-examined each witness." 5 The Board of Pharmacy found
that the pharmacists failed to keep proper records and that they
were guilty of "gross immorality." ' 1 6 Both pharmacists had their
licenses suspended." 7 They sought administrative review, and the
circuit court found that the motions for severance should have
been granted because the pharmacists had antagonistic defenses. " 8
The appellate court reversed and reinstated the Department's
suspension decision. 119 The court reiterated that the applicable
107. Id.
108. Id. at 998, 534 N.E.2d at 462. Eastman's social security number was listed incorrectly on one of the printouts. Id.
109. Id.
110. 177 Ill. App. 3d 349, 532 N.E.2d at 340 (1st Dist 1988).
111. The Department of Registration and Education is now called the Department of
Professional Regulation. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4400-2 (1989). See also
infra note 248 and accompanying text.
112. Sapstein, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 351, 532 N.E.2d at 341.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 351, 532 N.E.2d at 342.
119. Id. at 353, 532 N.E.2d at 342.
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standard for severance is not the criminal standard.' 20 Under the
administrative standard, a hearing officer may join cases in the "interest of efficient disposition where the matters contain common
issues of law or fact." '' A hearing officer's decision on a request
for severance is discretionary and may be challenged only for
abuse. '22 The court noted that separate hearings would not change
the result because the same witnesses would appear, and the same
cross-examination would be heard at both hearings.1 23 Therefore,
the court held that the hearing
officer did not abuse his discretion
24
in consolidating the actions.
4.

Impermissible Agency Sanctions

In Coleman v. Illinois Racing Board,12 5 the Illinois Supreme
Court held that an administrative agency may not deny reinstatement of a license based solely on past conduct of which the agency
was aware when it issued a prior sanction. The Illinois Racing
Board suspended a racetrack groom's license for two years, after
an electric goading device and a small amount of marijuana were
found in his quarters at a racetrack. 26 After the groom completed
his suspension, he applied for reinstatement. 2 Ruling that the Illinois Horse Racing Act granted the Racing Board discretionary
power, the Board permanently suspended the groom's license and
barred him from ever entering a racetrack in Illinois. 12 The circuit court upheld the decision of the Racing Board. 29 The appellate court reversed and ordered the Racing Board to reinstate the
30
groom.
The supreme court determined that the Racing Board could not
correct an excessively lenient suspension by imposing a lifetime
120. Id.at 352, 532 N.E.2d at 342 (citing Distaola v. Department of Regis. & Educ.,
72 Ill. App. 3d 977, 980, 391 N.E.2d 489, 491 (1st Dist. 1979)). A defendant seeking
severance in a criminal trial must show antagonism of defenses involved and must
demonstrate how joint trial would be prejudicial. People v. Lee, 87 Il.2d 182, 187, 429
N.E.2d 461, 463 (1981).
121. Sapstein, 177 Ill. App. 3d at 351, 532 N.E.2d at 342 (citing ILL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 68, § 110.40 (Supp. 1986).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 352, 532 N.E.2d at 342.
124. Id. The court further found that the plaintiffs would not have succeeded under
the criminal standard because their defenses were in no way antagonistic. Id.
125. 124 Ill. 2d 218, 225, 529 N.E.2d 520, 524 (1988).
126. Id. at 219, 529 N.E.2d at 521.
127. Id. at 220, 529 N.E.2d at 522.
128. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 8, para. 37-15(c) (1987)).
129. Id. at 219, 529 N.E.2d at 521.
130. Id.

1990]

Administrative Law

suspension for conduct that had already been punished. ' The
court did not question an agency's power to deny reinstatement if
reapplication reveals new evidence of misconduct. 3 2 The court,
however, found no legitimate new evidence; therefore, it reversed
133
the Racing Board's decision.
C. Administrative Review
Under section 3-101 of the Illinois Administrative Review
Law, 134 only "final" administrative decisions are subject to judicial
review. If the Administrative Review Law applies, a plaintiff has
thirty-five days from the date of a final decision or order to file for
administrative review. 135 Questions sometimes arise regarding the
effect of requests for agency rehearing or other agency review upon
the finality of an administrative order.
1. Exhaustion of Remedies and Finality of Orders
In Condell Hospital v. Health Facilities Planning Board,3 6 the
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the finality of an order as it
applies to one set of plaintiffs was not affected by a another party's
separate request for rehearing. In so holding, the court stated that
it was necessary to provide each party in an administrative proceeding "with a clear route from the administrative agency to the
1' 37
circuit court.'
In Condell Hospital, the Illinois Health Facilities Planning
Board ("Board") granted the defendant hospital a permit to construct a new facility. 3 ' Numerous area hospitals filed petitions
with the Board for rehearing; 39 an area health planning organization ("AHPO") also filed.140 The Board denied the area hospitals'
applications for rehearing.' 4 ' The Board informed the area hospitals, however, of the possibility of their intervention in AHPO's
131. Id. at 225, 529 N.E.2d at 524 (citing Burton v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 76 I11.
2d
522, 527-28, 394 N.E.2d 1168, 1170 (1979)).
132. Id.
133. Id. The court took care to point out that it would not determine whether it
would have been proper for the Board to issue a lifetime suspension when the groom was
first punished. Id. at 222, 529 N.E.2d at 523.
134. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 3-101 (1987).
135. Id. para. 3-103.
136. 124 Ill. 2d 341, 530 N.E.2d 217 (1988).
137. Id. at 368, 530 N.E.2d at 229.
138. Id. at 347, 530 N.E.2d at 220.
139. Id. at 348, 530 N.E.2d at 221.
140. Id. at 349, 530 N.E.2d at 221.
141. Id. at 351, 530 N.E.2d at 222.
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rehearing. 42 3 Subsequently,

AHPO

withdrew

its

separate

application. 14

The area hospitals filed a complaint for review in the circuit
court. '" Meanwhile, the hearing officer dismissed the matter after
the application for rehearing filed by AHPO was withdrawn. 45
The area hospitals filed their complaint for judicial review within
thirty-five days of the Board's denial of their application for rehearing.' 46 This was, however, almost three months before the
Board resolved the matter as to AHPO's rehearing."'
The defendant hospital argued that the filing of the area hospital's complaint for administrative review was premature; therefore,
their complaint should be dismissed as untimely.' 48 The circuit
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, 49 but the appellate court reversed.' 50
The supreme court affirmed, holding that the Board's decision
became final and subject to judicial review insofar as the area hospitals were concerned when the Board denied their motion for reconsideration.' 5' Initially, the court noted that there was no
question that had the AHPO chosen not to seek reconsideration,
the order denying the rehearing of the area hospital's application
would have been a final order. 52 At issue was whether the finality
of that order as applied to the area hospitals should be affected by
the separate application for rehearing filed by AHPO. 1 3 Interpreting section 3-103 of the Administrative Review Law, 5 4 the court
reasoned that "final orders remain final for those parties who do
not apply for reconsideration, or whose applications are no longer
pending."' 55 The area hospitals' intervention in the AHPO rehearing would constitute a separate proceeding and would not have affected their right to challenge the denial of their application for
142. Id.
143. Id. at 352, 530 N.E.2d at 222.
144. Id. at 353, 530 N.E.2d at 223.
145. Id. at 354-55, 530 N.E.2d at 223-224.
146. Id. at 353, 530 N.E.2d at 223.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 357, 530 N.E.2d at 225.
149. Id.
150. Id. See Condell Hosp. v. Health Facilities Planning Bd., 161 Ill. App. 3d 907,
515 N.E.2d 750 (1st Dist. 1987).
151. Condell Hospital, 124 Ill. 2d at 368, 530 N.E.2d at 229.
152. Id. at 365, 530 N.E.2d at 228.
153. Id. at 366, 530 N.E.2d at 228.
154. ILL. REV. STAT.ch. 110, para. 3-103 (1987).
155. Condell Hospital, 124 Ill. 2d at 366, 530 N.E.2d at 229.
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The court also determined that the area hospitals did not fail to
exhaust their administrative remedies by not intervening in the
area health planning organization's rehearing.' 57 The multiple
remedy exception to the exhaustion doctrine permits a party to
forego administrative remedies that are "parallel or duplicative."I 8
This proceeding would have been largely duplicative of its previous
59
motion for rehearing. 1

The court recognized that its Condell Hospital decision could
result in multiple and inconsistent administrative rulings.16 0 It

cautioned, however, that if an administrative decision is not final
until all parties have exhausted their administrative remedies, no
one party could ever be certain of when to seek judicial review. 161
The first district issued an important decision interpreting the
exhaustion of remedies requirement 162 in Castaneda v. Human
Rights Commission. 63 In Castaneda, the petitioner filed a civil
rights violation charge with the Illinois Department of Human
Rights.16 1 Following a hearing on the matter, an Illinois Human
Rights Commission administrative law judge found no evidence of
discrimination and recommended that the charge be dismissed. 165
A three-member panel of the Commission adopted the hearing officer's recommendation. 166 The petitioner appealed to the appellate
court without first seeking a rehearing before the entire
167
Commission.

The court dismissed the case sua sponte after concluding that
the petitioner had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he could have sought review before the entire Commis156. Id.
157. Id. at 368, 530 N.E.2d at 229. Generally, requiring the exhaustion of remedies
before judicial review promotes judicial economy and allows the agency to utilize its expertise without interference. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Allphin, 60 Ill. 2d 350, 358, 326
N.E.2d 737, 741-42 (1975).
158. Condell Hospital, 124 Ill. 2d at 368, 530 N.E.2d at 729 (citing Fredman Bros.
Furniture Co. v. Department of Revenue, 109 Ill. 2d 202, 214, 486 N.E.2d 893, 897
(1985)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 368, 530 N.E.2d at 229-30.
162. For a discussion of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, see supra note 157.
163. 175 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 530 N.E.2d 1005 (1st Dist. 1988), aff'd, 132 Ill. 2d 304,
547 N.E.2d 437 (1989).
164. Castaneda, 175 Ill. App. 3d at 1086, 530 N.E.2d at 1006.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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sion. I " To comply with the exhaustion of remedies mandate, the
petitioner was required to seek further review before the Commission. ' The court explained that the exhaustion of remedies requirement cannot be sidestepped because the relief "may be, or
even probably will be, denied by the agency. "170
2.

Complaint for Administrative Review

The plaintiff in Burns v. Edgar171 did not file a complaint for
administrative review of the decision revoking his driving privileges. Instead, he filed a petition in circuit court for a preliminary
injunction pending a final determination of an administrative review proceeding. 72 The circuit court granted the preliminary injunction. 173 Meanwhile, the Illinois Secretary of State denied the
plaintiff's request to rescind the revocation order. Subsequently,
both parties filed briefs before the trial court in the injunction proceeding. 17 4 The circuit court that issued the preliminary injunction
then reversed the decision of the Secretary as against the manifest
weight of the evidence. 175
On appeal, the court stated that the Administrative Review Law
confers jurisdiction on a circuit court to review any action of the
Secretary "canceling, suspending, revoking, or denying a license." 176 To obtain such review, however, the plaintiff must file a
complaint for administrative review within thirty-five days of being
served with the administrative decision. 77 Because the plaintiff
168. Id. at 1088, 530 N.E.2d at 1007.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1087-88, 530 N.E.2d at 1007 (citing Northwestern Univ. v. City of Evanston, 74 Ill. 2d 80, 89, 383 N.E.2d 964, 967 (1978)). After the Survey period ended, the
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court decision in Castaneda. See Castaneda
v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 547 N.E.2d 437 (1989). The supreme
court held that petitioners seeking review of decisions by three-member panels of the
Human Rights Commission must seek an en bloc rehearing before the Commission in
order to exhaust their administrative remedies and render the agency decision final and
reviewable. Id. at 321-22, 547 N.E.2d at 445. The court distinguished Castaneda from
Condell Hospital by noting that Condell Hospital was not a case in which "the party
seeking review was the same party entitled to the rehearing." Id. at 324, 547 N.E.2d at
446. See supra notes 136-61 and accompanying text for discussion of Condell Hospital.
171. 178 Ill. App. 3d 708, 709, 533 N.E.2d 570, 571 (4th Dist.), appeal denied, 541
N.E.2d 1104 (1989).
172. Id. at 710, 533 N.E.2d at 571.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 711, 533 N.E.2d at 572 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, para. 6-421
(1987)).
177. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 3-103 (1987)).
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never complied with this jurisdictional requirement, the court that
issued the injunction did not have subject matter jurisdiction to
review the revocation decision in the course of the injunction
proceeding."7
3.

Jurisdiction When Plaintiff Seeks Only a Stay and Remand

In Dubin v. Personnel Board,'7 9 Dubin was discharged by the
City of Chicago Personnel Board ("Board") because he did not
comply with the City's residency requirement. In response, he
filed an action in the circuit court, requesting an equitable order
staying the Board's decision. 80 In his petition to the court, Dubin
contended that the Board's findings of fact were insufficient and
that additional factfinding was needed before administrative review
would be proper.'8" The trial court issued the stay and remanded
the matter to the Board for further findings of fact. 8 2 The Board
appealed the stay order.8 3
At issue before the supreme court was whether the circuit court
had jurisdiction to issue the stay remedy.8 4 Initially, the court recognized that a party may seek judicial review of an agency decision
either by way of common law or statutory review. 18- The remedies
provided under each system of review are largely identical.'8 6
When an enabling act specifically invokes the Administrative Review Law, the plaintiff is limited to bringing an action seeking full
judicial review, and a court may not redress the parties grievances
through other types of actions. 87 The court found that the Ad178. Id.
179. 128 Ill. 2d 490, 492-93, 539 N.E.2d 1243, 1244 (1989).
180. Id. at 493, 539 N.E.2d at 1244.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 492, 539 N.E.2d at 1243.
183. Id. The appellate court found that the stay order was not a final order; therefore, it lacked appellate jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 494, 539 N.E.2d at 1244. One
appellate court justice noted that a split of authority exists among the appellate districts
regarding the appealability of stay orders entered under the Administrative Review Law.
Id. The supreme court found that it had no reason to resolve this split on the appealability issue because the trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the order in the first place.
Id. at 495, 539 N.E.2d at 1245.
184. Id. In the supreme court, the Board maintained that the circuit court had
lacked jurisdiction because Dubin did not file a complaint. Id. The supreme court found
that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction for the reason discussed above. Id
185. Id. at 497, 539 N.E.2d at 1246.
186. Id. at 498, 539 N.E.2d at 1246. "[T]he differences which once existed between
the common law and statutory methods of reviewing administrative decisions have been
all but lost .... Id.
187. Id. (citing Christian Action Ministry v. Department of Local Gov't Affairs, 74
Ill. 2d 51, 59-60, 383 N.E.2d 958, 961 (1978).
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ministrative Review Law was inapplicable, but common law review through a writ of certiorari provided the same nature and
scope of judicial review. 88 Because the court's jurisdiction to review an agency decision is no greater than when statutory procedures apply, the court found that an action for judicial review of
the Board's discharge order was the sole method for Dubin to obtain the relief he sought.'89 The court reasoned that if it were to
reach any other conclusion, a party could potentially litigate every
alleged error committed during an administrative proceeding
separately. 190
4.

Timeliness of Appeal

The question of when an appeal is timely filed is a persistent
topic of debate among practitioners in the area. Resolutions of
timeliness questions were among the more significant developments of the Survey period.
In Kozel v. State Board of Elections, 9 ' the Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that the electoral board's issuance of an amended decision did not extend the time in which a petitioner could file for
review; consequently, the appeal was dismissed as untimely. Kenneth Kozel (the candidate) and Douglas Olivero (the objector)
92
were both running for resident circuit judge of LaSalle County. 93
The objector challenged the candidate's nomination petition.
The State Board of Elections, sitting as an electoral board, rejected
the objections and declared that the nomination papers were sufficient.' 94 The electoral board then mistakenly held that the candidate's name should not be certified for inclusion on the ballot.' 95
Four days later, the electoral board issued an amended decision
that stated the candidate's name should be on the ballot. 96 The
objector filed a petition for judicial review fourteen days after the
initial decision and nine days after the amended decision stated
188. Id.
189. Id. at 499, 539 N.E.2d at 1247.
190. Id. The court reversed the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts and
remanded to the circuit court with directions to dismiss the petition. Id.
191. 126 Ill. 2d 58, 69, 533 N.E.2d 796, 801 (1988).
192. Id. at 60, 533 N.E.2d at 797.
193. Id. The candidate had submitted nominating petitions containing some 963 signatures in support of his candidacy; the objector challenged 528 of the signatures. Five
hundred signatures are required by statute. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 710(h) (1987).
194. Kozel, 126 Ill. 2d at 63, 533 N.E.2d at 798.
195. Id. at 63, 533 N.E.2d at 799.
196. Id.
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that the candidate should be certified. 197
Because the Election Code requires that a party seeking review
file a petition within ten days after the electoral board decision, the
candidate moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.1 9 The objector maintained that he was challenging
the corrected decision, which was nine days old when he filed for
review. 199 The circuit court denied the candidate's motion to dismiss the appeal and affirmed the electoral board's decision to certify the candidate. 2" Both the candidate and objector appealed. 20 '
The appellate court affirmed both circuit court rulings.202
The supreme court ruled that the part of the electoral board's
decision ordering the candidate's name not be certified was "surplusage" because the electoral board was without power to pass on
h electoral
lcoa board's
or'
the certification issue. 203 The court ntdta
noted that the
function is limited to consideration of objections to a candidate's
nomination papers. 2° Certification of names for inclusion on the
ballot, the court ruled, rests with the State Board of Elections acting in its own capacity. 20 5 The court did not agree that the initial
decision was unenforceable because the electoral board exceeded
its authority. 2° Instead, the court stated that the electoral board's
decision was "complete and effective" once it ruled on the adequacy of the candidate's nomination petition.20 7 Because the objector could have filed for review after the first decision, issuance of
the corrected decision did not extend the time in which the objector could file for review.208
Statutes and rules governing timeliness of appeal sometimes conflict, or seem to conflict, making it difficult to determine the proper
period for filing. The Appellate Court for the First District issued
two opinions during the Survey period that bear on this issue.
In Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com197. Id.
198. Id. at 67, 533 N.E.2d at 801 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 10-10.1
(1987)).
199. Id. at 64, 533 N.E.2d at 799.
200. Id. at 63-64, 533 N.E.2d at 799.
201. Id. The candidate appealed only the denial of his motion to dismiss. Id.
202. Id. See Kozel v. State Bd. of Elections, 168 Ill. App. 3d 501, 522 N.E.2d 908
(4th Dist.), dismissed, 126 Ill. 2d 58, 533 N.E.2d 796 (1988).
203. Kozel, 126 Ill. 2d at 68, 533 N.E.2d at 801.
204. Id.
205. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 7-14 (1987)).
206. Id. at 69, 533 N.E.2d at 801.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 69-70, 533 N.E.2d at 802.
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mission,' ° the court held that Section 201(a) of the Illinois Public
Utilities Act 21O preempts Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a) 21I regarding the timing of petitions to the appellate court for direct review of an agency action.21 2 Peoples Gas filed for review of a
Illinois Commerce Commission ("ICC") order that denied the gas
company the right to bill a customer for estimated consumption,
the second time the gas meter measuring consumption malfunctioned and under-registered the gas supplied. 213 The gas company
appealed directly to the appellate court.21 4
Peoples Gas presented a conffict between Rule 303(a), which requires commencement of a direct appeal within thirty days after an
order is entered, 215' and section 10-201(a) of the Illinois Public Utilities Act, which requires commencement within thirty days after
an order is served.21 6 The ICC argued that the appeal was untimely because the filing period for review under Rule 303(a) had
expired before the gas company filed for review. 7
The court did not agree that Rule 330(a) should govern.2 18 The
court noted that it is within the legislature's authority to fix the
time period for administrative review.21 9 Moreover, the court
noted that supreme court rules applicable to direct review reflect
the court's intent to defer to statutory filing deadlines. 220 The
court held that the statute preempted the rule; consequently, the
gas company's petition was timely filed and the court proceeded to
review the I.C.C.'s order.221
By contrast, the court in County of Cook, Cermak Health Services v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board 222 held that Illinois
209. 175 Ill. App. 3d 39, 529 N.E.2d 671 (1st Dist. 1988).
210. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 10-201(a) (1987).
211. ILL. S. Cr. R. 303(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 303(a) (1987).
212. 175 I11.App. 3d at 45, 529 N.E.2d at 676.
213. Id. at 43, 529 N.E.2d at 674.
214. Id.
215. ILL. S. CT. R. 303(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10A, para. 303(a) (1987).
216. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, para. 10-201(a) (1987).
217. 175 Ill. App. 3d at 45, 529 N.E.2d at 675.
218. Id. at 45, 529 N.E.2d at 675-76.
219. Id. (citing City of Benton Police Dep't v. Human Rights Comm'n, 147 Ill. App.
3d 7, 13, 497 N.E.2d 876, 881 (5th Dist. 1986), appealdenied,118 111. 2d 541, 520 N.E.2d
383 (1988)).
220. Id. at 45, 529 N.E.2d at 676.
221. Id.
222. 189 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 545 N.E.2d 934, withdrawn rereported, 551 N.E.2d 229
supp. op. (1st Dist. 1989), reh'g denied, 1990 Ill. App. Lexis 211 (1st Dist.), appeal
granted, No. 69644 (Apr. 4, 1990).
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Supreme Court Rule 303(a), 223 and not section 3-103 of the Administrative Review Law,224 set the proper filing period for direct
review.225 In Cermak, the petitioner provided health care services
to persons incarcerated in Cook County.226 The petitioner established new job criteria for certain emergency medical technicians.227 The union representing the technicians accused the
petitioner of committing an unfair labor practice by not bargaining
over imposition of the new criteria before adopting them.228 An
Illinois Labor Relations Board hearing officer recommended that
the petitioner be ordered to cease and desist from imposing the new
criteria unless it first bargained in good faith with the union.229
Subsequently, the Labor Board issued a cease and desist order and
directed the petitioner to rescind the new criteria and to reinstate
the displaced technicians with backpay. 230 The petitioner filed for
direct review in the appellate court thirty-two days after the Labor
Board's order was entered.23 '
The court initially noted that the Illinois Public Labor Relations
Act invokes the Administrative Review Law to govern review of
agency action.232 Relying on Peoples Gas,233 the petitioner argued
that the thirty-five day limit of section 3-103 of the Administrative
Review Law should therefore control. 234 The Cermak court, nevertheless, found Peoples Gas "inapposite. ' 235 Unlike the statute in
Peoples Gas, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act does not expressly state a time within which direct appellate review must be
commenced. 236 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335(h), 237 however,
establishes that the thirty-day filing requirement of Rule 303 is applicable to direct review of agency decisions.238 Therefore, this
223. See supra note 215 and accompanying text for a description of the Rule's
provisions.
224. See supra note 135 and accompanying text for mention of the section's filing
provisions.
225. Cermak, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 1063, 551 N.E.2d at 234.
226. Id. at 1058, 551 N.E.2d at 230.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1058, 551 N.E.2d at 230-31.
230. Id. at 1058, 551 N.E.2d at 231.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1059, 551 N.E.2d at 231 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1611(e)
(1987)).
233. See supra notes 209-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of Peoples Gas.
234. Cermak, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 1062, 551 N.E.2d at 233.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1063, 551 N.E.2d at 233.
237. ILL. S. CT. R. 335(h), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 335(h) (1987).
238. Cermak, 189 Ill. App. 3d at 1060, 551 N.E.2d at 232.
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case did not present the type of conflict present in Peoples Gas.239
The court concluded that although section 3-103 governs a petition
for review in the circuit court, Rule 303(a) governs direct review in
the appellate court. 2 1 Because the petition for direct review was
not filed within thirty days of final judgment, the court dismissed
the action for lack of jurisdiction.241
III.

LEGISLATION

During the Survey period, the Illinois General Assembly enacted
legislation that has special significance for those who practice administrative law.
A.

Open Meetings

The Illinois General Assembly amended portions of the Open
Meetings Act.242 One new provision requires that all final action
taken at an open session be preceded by a recital informing the
public of the business being conducted.243 Another provision requires that public bodies meet no less than semi-annually to review
minutes of any closed sessions and to determine whether the need
for confidentiality persists, or whether the minutes of the closed
sessions can be made public. 2 "
B. Public Aid Review
The Illinois General Assembly amended provisions of the Public
Aid Code to revise the makeup of the review Committee, effective
January 9, 1989.24' The amendment allows for participation on the
Committee by persons who are not officers, agents or employees of
the local government unit.246
C. Medical PracticeLicensing
The Illinois General Assembly amended licensing provisions of
239. Id. at 1060, 551 N.E.2d at 233.
240. Id. at 1060, 551 N.E.2d at 233-34 (rejecting City of Benton Police Dep't v.
Human Rights Comm'n, 147 Il1. App. 3d 7, 11, 497 N.E.2d 876, 879 (5th Dist. 1986)).
241. Id. at 1060, 551 N.E.2d at 234.
242. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, paras. 41-46 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989). The Open
Meetings Act is intended to ensure that meetings of public bodies are open to the public
except when open meetings would result in disclosure of confidential or privileged information or cause significant disruption. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, para. 41 (1987).
243. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 102, para. 42 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
244. Id. para. 42.06.
245. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 11-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
246. Id.
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the Medical Practice Act of 1987, effective January 1, 1989.247 The
licensing entity, formerly the Department of Registration and Education, is now called the Department of Professional Regulation. 48
Other changes set new criteria for licensure of visiting physicians
and of physicians who graduated before 1985.249 Additions to section 11 of the Act set minimum standards of professional education
for licensure of physicians who graduated before 1985.250 Under a
new provision of section 18, the Department may issue a temporary license to a visiting physician if that physician has received 2an
51
invitation or appointment from an approved school or hospital.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Illinois Supreme Court issued a number of decisions during
the Survey period that clarify established principles of administrative law. Landmarks PreservationCouncil v. Chicago,252 provides a

working definition of agency action and reminds practitioners that
the starting point for administrative review must be an administrative action. Moreover, Landmarks provides fundamental guidance
to attorneys representing home rule units that carry out both administrative and legislative functions. The court also made clear,
in Dubin v. Personnel Board,253 that nothing short of a complaint
for administrative review confers jurisdiction on courts reviewing
agency action. Additionally, after Condell Hospital v. Health Facilities PlanningBoard,254 and Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights
Commission,255 the law is well-settled regarding exhaustion of rem247. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 4400-2, 4400-11, 4400-18, 4400-19 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1989).
248. Id. para. 4400-2.
249. Id. paras. 4400-11, 4400-18, 4400-19.
250. Id. para. 4400-11. During the Survey period, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of section 11 of the 1987 Act. See Potts v. Illinois Dep't of Regis. &
Educ., 128 Ill. 2d 322, 538 N.E.2d 1140 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 540 (1989). In
Potts, the court held that section 11(B), which provides that only graduates of chiropractic colleges may be granted a limited license to treat persons without drugs or surgery,
does not violate due process or equal protection rights of naprapaths, rather it is rationally related to the legitimate government objective of protecting the public from unqualified medical practitioners. 128 Ill. 2d at 333-35, 538 N.E.2d at 1145-46.
251. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, para. 4400-18(B) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989).
252. 125 111. 2d 164, 531 N.E.2d 9 (1989). See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying
text.
253. 128 Ill. 2d 490, 539 N.E.2d 1243 (1989). See supra notes 179-90 and accompanying text.
254. 124 Ill. 2d 341, 530 N.E. 2d 217 (1988). See supra notes 136-61 and accompanying text.
255. 175 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 530 N.E. 2d 1005 (1st Dist. 1988), aff'd, 132 Ill. 2d 304,
547 N.E.2d 437 (1989). See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
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edies and finality of orders.
Furthermore, the Illinois Appellate Court districts issued significant decisions on the issue of timeliness of appeal. People's Gas v.
ilinois Commerce Commission,256 and County of Cook, Cermak
Health Services v. Local Labor Relations Board257 are especially
important to practitioners of administrative law because they seek
to clarify the confusing interplay between limitation periods in
statutes and supreme court rules.

256. 175 Il. App. 3d 39, 529 N.E.2d 671 (1st Dist 1989). See supra notes 209-21 and
accompanying text.
257. 189 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 545 N.E.2d 934 (1st Dist. 1989). See supra notes 222-41
and accompanying text.

